

Ahead of the Polls?

Sinn Féin, Facebook and the 2020 Irish General Election

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Abstract

Sinn Féin's first place in the Irish general election of February 2020 surprised most observers. The party had lost half its council seats in May 2019 and polled at about 14% in October and November. I ask whether Facebook saw the surge coming. Using 297,790 posts from 357 Irish politicians' Facebook pages tracked by CrowdTangle between November 2016 and October 2020, I measure each party's share of the interactions on politicians' pages month by month and compare it with published polls and results. In ordinary times Sinn Féin's share was close to its poll rating: about 20% of interactions in 2018 and early 2019, against polls of 16% to 18%. Measured against votes, Facebook over-represented the left opposition, Solidarity–People Before Profit above all, and under-represented Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil. In the autumn of 2019 Sinn Féin's share rose sharply, from 18% in September to 30% in October and 38% in December, while its average poll rating, adjusted for differences between pollsters, rose from 13% in October to 18% in December and 21% in January. The three-month rise of 12 points was more than twice as large as any earlier rise in the series. But it was not clean. The October jump was concentrated in a few posts and pages, partly around the budget and Brexit; outside the page of Pearse Doherty, Sinn Féin's finance spokesperson, the share fell back in November, and the broad rise began in December. Earlier single-month jumps of similar size were not followed by poll gains, and across 2017–19 changes in Facebook share did not predict changes in the polls. Within the same pages, Sinn Féin posts drew modestly more engagement in October to December than before, an effect of marginal significance and similar to a seasonal rise in 2018. The case offers a qualified answer: an unusually large and sustained shift in Facebook attention came one to three months before most pollsters recorded Sinn Féin's rise, but the same measure has produced false signals, and its level is a poor guide to the vote.

Keywords: Sinn Féin; Ireland; 2020 general election; Facebook; CrowdTangle; election forecasting; opinion polls; political engagement

1 Introduction

On 8 February 2020 Sinn Féin won 24.5% of first-preference votes in the Irish general election, more than any other party and almost double its 13.8% in 2016 ([Gallagher et al. 2021](#)). Eight months earlier,

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in the local elections of May 2019, it had won 9.5% and lost almost half its council seats ([Wikipedia contributors 2026a](#)). In October and November 2019 its average poll rating was about 14% ([Wikipedia contributors 2026b](#)). Most of the rise in the polls came in December and January, and the party ran too few candidates to convert all of it into seats ([Gallagher et al. 2021](#)).

An election that surprises the polls is a natural test for the claim that social media can see what surveys miss. Early studies suggested that the volume of social media activity about a party tracked its vote ([Tumasjan et al. 2010](#); [DiGrazia et al. 2013](#)). A long line of work has since shown how fragile such predictions are, on Twitter and on Facebook alike ([Jungherr et al. 2012](#); [Gayo-Avello 2013](#); [Schoen et al. 2013](#); [Cameron et al. 2016](#); [Jungherr 2016](#)). Online attention over-represents some parties and voters, and the parties that win the internet do not always win elections. In earlier work on Britain I found the same: Jeremy Corbyn and Nigel Farage dominated Facebook engagement far beyond their poll ratings ([Hotham 2026b](#)), and populist parties across Europe drew more engagement than their votes ([Hotham 2026a](#)).

The Irish case lets me separate two versions of the claim. The strong version is that a party's share of social media attention indicates its likely vote. The weak version is that *changes* in that share can signal a shift in public mood before polls detect it, even if the level is biased. A party can be persistently over-represented online and still show an informative change; and a measure can show large changes that mean nothing.

I use CrowdTangle data on 357 Irish politicians' Facebook pages, from TDs, senators, MEPs, councillors and candidates, to trace each party's share of engagement from November 2016 to October 2020. I compare these shares with the 2019 local elections, with 86 published polls from 2017 to 2020 and with the 2020 result. The analysis is descriptive. It cannot show that Facebook caused anything, and one election cannot establish a forecasting method. It can show whether, in this case, the online signal was present early, whether it is robust to the obvious artefacts, and how often the same measure gave similar signals that came to nothing.

2 Background

2.1 Social media and election outcomes

Studies that tried to predict elections from social media counts produced a burst of optimism and then a sustained critique. Counts of mentions, likes or followers vary with the platform's user base, with the intensity of a party's supporters and with the news, and choices about which parties, dates and measures to include can change the answer ([Jungherr et al. 2012](#); [Gayo-Avello 2013](#); [Schoen et al. 2013](#)). Studies using Facebook likes, such as one for New Zealand, found some association with results but large errors for individual parties ([Cameron et al. 2016](#)). Reviews of Twitter research conclude that social media metrics describe attention and mobilisation better than they forecast votes ([Jungherr 2016](#)), and candidate studies find small electoral effects of social media activity at most ([Bright et al. 2020](#)).

Engagement with politicians' Facebook pages is driven by people who choose to like, comment on and share their content ([Kalsnes et al. 2017](#); [Stier et al. 2018](#)). It is better understood as a measure of the size and intensity of a party's active online following than as a sample of voters. Parties whose supporters are young, committed or angry at the government should draw more engagement than their vote implies, and opposition parties that campaign on grievances should be over-represented.

2.2 Sinn Féin before 2020

Sinn Féin fits that description. Its electorate is younger and more working class than average, it was in opposition throughout the period, and it campaigned on housing, health and the cost of living (Gallagher et al. 2021). Its leadership changed in February 2018, when Mary Lou McDonald succeeded Gerry Adams. The 2019 local and European elections went badly for it, and few observers expected it to top the poll nine months later. The governing arrangement in this period was a Fine Gael minority government supported by Fianna Fáil under a confidence-and-supply agreement.

These features suggest two expectations. First, Sinn Féin’s level of engagement may differ from its vote, so the level would be a poor guide to the result. Second, if a shift towards Sinn Féin was under way among its potential supporters before it appeared in the polls, its share of engagement might rise before its poll rating. If the second expectation holds, the question is whether such a rise would have been distinguishable from the ordinary ups and downs of the series.

3 Data and methods

3.1 Pages and posts

The data come from CrowdTangle, Facebook’s public-content tool (CrowdTangle Team 2020). In October 2020, during my doctoral research (Hotham 2021), I exported every post from a CrowdTangle list of Irish politicians’ pages titled “Ireland Politicians 2020”. The list contains 357 pages of TDs, senators, MEPs, councillors, candidates and a few local party branches. Because the list was assembled in 2020, it may favour politicians who were prominent or successful that year, a concern I test below. CrowdTangle limits each export, so the posts start in mid-October 2016. I use posts from 1 November 2016 to 28 October 2020: 297,790 posts with 21.0 million interactions. Interactions are the sum of reactions (likes, love, wow, haha, sad, angry, care), comments and shares, as counted at the time of export rather than when the post was made.

I coded each page by party from public knowledge of the politician’s affiliation between 2016 and 2020, with AI assistance, using the page name and the party names each page mentioned in its own posts as cues. Politicians who left or joined parties in the period are coded by their affiliation for most of it. Independents include members of Independents 4 Change and the Independent Alliance. “Solidarity–People Before Profit” combines the two parts of that alliance. Twenty-nine pages, with 2.1% of all interactions, could not be confidently coded and are kept as unclassified, which limits how far any coding error could move the shares. The coding should be checked independently, and the page list with its coding is deposited with this paper.

3.2 Measures

The main measure is each party’s share of all interactions on politicians’ pages in a period. Shares are robust to changes in Facebook’s overall reach and in total political attention, which rose sharply during the campaign. I compare shares in four windows: the eight weeks before the local and European elections of 24 May 2019; June to September 2019; October to December 2019; and the formal campaign from 14 January, when the election was called, to polling day on 8 February 2020.

For polls I use the 86 published national polls from January 2017 to 1 February 2020 commissioned by

media outlets, compiled from public sources ([Wikipedia contributors 2026b](#)); those from June 2019 are listed in the appendix. I exclude one poll commissioned by Sinn Féin. Pollsters differed systematically: relative to the monthly average, Red C put Sinn Féin 2.3 points lower and Behaviour & Attitudes 1.3 points higher. I therefore report both raw monthly means and means adjusted for each pollster's average difference. Vote shares are first-preference shares in the 2019 local elections ([Wikipedia contributors 2026a](#)) and the 2020 general election ([Gallagher et al. 2021](#)).

3.3 Checks

Five checks address the obvious artefacts. First, list selection: I repeat the analysis for the 247 pages that were already posting by July 2017, and separately exclude the 15 Sinn Féin pages of people who were first elected, or first stood, in 2020 or later. Second, a few viral posts can dominate a month, so I remove each party's ten most engaging posts in each month. Third, one page carried much of Sinn Féin's autumn engagement, so I remove the page of Pearse Doherty. Fourth, a rise in share could come from posting more rather than from more engagement per post. I decompose the change and estimate the change in engagement per post within the same pages, using a regression of log interactions on period, party and page fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by page, and run the same model for the same months of 2017 and 2018 as a placebo. Fifth, to ask whether the autumn rise was unusual, I compare it with every earlier month from February 2017 to September 2019 and check whether earlier rises were followed by poll gains.

4 Findings

4.1 The level of engagement

Sinn Féin politicians drew more engagement than any other party's for much of the period (Figure 1). In 2017, a year that included Martin McGuinness's resignation and death and Gerry Adams's announcement that he would step down as leader, they drew 27% of all interactions on politicians' pages. In 2018 they drew 20%, roughly level with Fine Gael (22%), Independents (18%) and Fianna Fáil (18%). Solidarity–People Before Profit, a much smaller party, drew 14%.

How far this was over-representation depends on the benchmark. Against polls, Sinn Féin's share was close to its rating in ordinary times: 20% of interactions in 2018, when its polls averaged 18%, and 21% from January to May 2019, against polls of 17%. Against votes the gap was much larger. In the eight weeks before the 2019 local elections Sinn Féin politicians drew 21% of interactions and the party won 9.5% of the vote, though local elections differ from national ones in turnout and in the strength of independents. In 2020 it drew 41% of interactions during the campaign and won 24.5% (Table 1).

The clearest pattern is across parties (Figure 2). In both elections Solidarity–People Before Profit drew more than four times the engagement its vote would imply (4.8 and 4.6), Sinn Féin about twice (2.2 and 1.7), and Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil about half (0.46 to 0.60). On Facebook, the parties of the left opposition were over-represented and the two largest parties under-represented, whatever the result.




Figure 1. Share of all interactions on Irish politicians' Facebook pages, by party, November 2016 to October 2020. Three-month centred averages.

4.2 The autumn of 2019

From June to September 2019 Sinn Féin drew 18% to 22% of interactions each month. In October its share rose to 30%, in December to 38%, and in the first eight days of February to 46% (Figure 3, Table 2). Fianna Fáil lost most ground: its share fell from 21% in June to September to 15% in October to December and 11% during the campaign. Fine Gael's share was unchanged in the autumn (16%), and no other party rose by more than about one point.

The polls moved later and less uniformly. Adjusted for pollster differences, Sinn Féin's average was 16.5% in September, 13.4% in October, 14.5% in November, 17.6% in December and 21.1% in January. Pollsters disagreed. Red C put the party at 11% in October and November and at 19% and 24% in late January. Behaviour & Attitudes, by contrast, had it at 16% to 20% throughout September to January, with no January surge. Ipsos MRBI did not poll between mid-October and mid-January. Part of the January rise was also a recovery: in early 2019, before the local elections, Sinn Féin had polled at about 17% to 18%.

4.3 How robust is the rise?

The rise survives the list-selection checks. Among the 247 pages already posting by July 2017, Sinn Féin's share rose from 19% in September to 31% in October and 40% in December. Excluding the newer Sinn Féin figures, it rose from 17% to 28% and 37%.

The timing is less robust. The October jump was concentrated: Sinn Féin's ten most engaging posts made up 37% of its interactions that month, against 19% in September, and a single post accounted for 14%. Pearse Doherty's page alone drew 30% of all interactions on Sinn Féin pages from October to December. Without his page, Sinn Féin's share rose from 17% in September to 24% in October but fell back to 21% in November, within its range for the year, before rising to 31% in December. Without his page and the newer figures, November returns to the September level. The October jump was also

Table 1. Share of interactions on politicians’ Facebook pages and share of first-preference votes or polls, by party (%). The local election window is 1 April to 24 May 2019; autumn 2019 is October to December 2019, compared with the mean of seven polls; the general election window is 14 January to 8 February 2020.

	2019 local elections		Autumn 2019		2020 general election	
	Facebook	Vote	Facebook	Polls	Facebook	Vote
Sinn Féin	20.9	9.5	32.6	14.9	40.8	24.5
Fianna Fáil	15.7	26.9	14.7	25.4	11.5	22.2
Fine Gael	15.2	25.3	15.9	28.9	9.7	20.9
Solidarity–PBP	9.0	1.9	11.5	–	11.9	2.6
Green Party	7.8	5.5	2.1	–	2.6	7.1
Labour	3.7	5.7	3.4	–	2.5	4.4
Social Democrats	2.4	2.3	0.9	–	1.7	2.9
Aontú	1.2	1.5	2.2	–	1.8	1.9
Independents	17.8	–	13.8	–	12.8	–
Other parties	1.5	–	0.5	–	0.8	–
Not classified	5.0	–	2.4	–	4.0	–

Table 2. Sinn Féin’s share of interactions on politicians’ Facebook pages by month under five definitions, and the mean of published polls, raw and adjusted for pollster differences (%). “Newer figures” are the 15 Sinn Féin pages of people first elected, or first standing, in 2020 or later.

Month	Sinn Féin share of Facebook interactions					Polls	
	All	Pages active by mid-2017	Top 10 removed	Doherty removed	Doherty and newer figures removed	Mean	Adjusted
June 2019	19.2	20.4	18.5	17.4	15.8	12.0	10.7
July	20.8	21.6	20.3	19.2	17.5	14.0	12.7
August	22.3	22.9	20.7	19.3	17.3	–	–
September	18.3	18.5	17.8	17.2	16.0	16.0	16.5
October	29.9	31.2	26.0	24.0	22.3	13.7	13.4
November	29.4	31.1	25.5	21.2	17.6	14.0	14.5
December	38.2	39.7	30.8	30.7	28.5	17.5	17.6
January 2020	37.4	40.8	37.1	33.4	28.7	20.7	21.1

tied to the news: posts mentioning the budget, announced on 8 October, made up 24% of Sinn Féin’s interactions that month, and posts mentioning Brexit 15%. In November and December posts about motor insurance, on which Doherty’s bill was passing through the Oireachtas, made up 17% and 18%, and in December posts about TDs handing back a pay increase made up 13%. Among the most engaging posts were also posts with a nationalist theme, about Brexit and Irish history. The broad-based rise, across pages and without a few dominant posts, begins in December.

Within the same pages, and relative to other parties’ posts, Sinn Féin posts drew about a fifth more engagement from October to December than from June to September (0.19 log points, SE 0.10, $p = 0.05$). Without Doherty’s page the estimate is 0.16 ($p = 0.09$). The same model for the same months of 2018 gives 0.11 ($p = 0.16$) and for 2017 -0.09 , so part of the autumn rise may be seasonal: October is budget month, and Sinn Féin’s share also rose between September and October in 2017 (by 8.5 points) and 2018 (4.5 points), against 11.6 points in 2019. During the campaign the effect was much larger: Sinn Féin posts drew about 110% more engagement than before (0.74 log points, SE 0.13).




Figure 2. Ratio of each party's share of Facebook interactions to its share of first-preference votes, 2019 local elections and 2020 general election.

4.4 How unusual was it?

Measured month by month, the October jump was not exceptional. Between February 2017 and September 2019 Sinn Féin's share rose by ten points or more in a single month three times (Table 4): in March 2017 (McGuinness's death), June 2017 and February 2018 (McDonald's election as leader). Only the last was followed by a rise in the polls, of 2.6 points over the next three months. The standard deviation of the month-to-month change was 7.0 points.

What distinguishes the autumn of 2019 is persistence. The average of October to December was 12.0 points above the average of July to September. The largest such three-month rise before then was 5.9 points, in October 2018, and the polls fell in the following months. Across 2017 to September 2019, three-month changes in Sinn Féin's Facebook share were unrelated to changes in its poll rating over the following one to three months (correlation -0.04). The autumn of 2019 was therefore unusual within this series, but the series as a whole had not been a reliable guide to the polls.

4.5 Posting, video and followers

Sinn Féin politicians both posted more and drew more engagement per post. Across their pages they posted 21 times a day from June to September 2019, 31 times a day in the autumn and 102 times a day during the campaign. The mean post drew 83 interactions before the autumn, 139 in the autumn and 334 during the campaign. In the autumn the median post barely changed (32 to 35 interactions): the rise came from the posts that did well doing much better. During the campaign the whole distribution moved, with the median post drawing 124 interactions.

Video carried a growing share of Sinn Féin's engagement: 21% from June to September, 38% in the autumn and 44% during the campaign. This was not distinctive. Solidarity–People Before Profit drew 36% of its autumn engagement from video and Fine Gael 40% during the campaign. Shares made up 18% of interactions on Sinn Féin pages from June 2019 to the election, against 10% on Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael pages, but 24% on Solidarity–People Before Profit pages.




Figure 3. Sinn Féin’s monthly share of interactions on politicians’ Facebook pages (the last point covers 1 to 8 February 2020), individual published polls, and the monthly mean of polls adjusted for differences between pollsters, June 2019 to February 2020.

Page likes followed rather than led. For the 24 Sinn Féin pages present in every month of the comparison, combined page likes rose by 3% between June and September 2019 and by 7% by December, much as Fine Gael’s (3% and 8%) and Fianna Fáil’s (2% and 5%). Sinn Féin’s pages then pulled away, reaching 113% of their June level in January, 128% in February and 140% in March, against 109%, 111% and 118% for Fine Gael.

4.6 What the campaign was about

During the campaign Sinn Féin politicians posted about housing more often than the large parties (17% of posts, against 11% for Fianna Fáil and 7% for Fine Gael), and about health and pensions more often too. Solidarity–People Before Profit and the Social Democrats mentioned housing more often still (21% and 24%). Pooling all parties, posts about housing did not draw more engagement than other posts by the same politician, and posts about health drew slightly more (0.05 log points, SE 0.03). Sinn Féin’s campaign advantage was not mainly a matter of topic.

5 Discussion

5.1 Level and change

The Irish case separates two claims that are often run together. Sinn Féin’s *level* of Facebook engagement was a poor guide to its vote. It ran close to its poll rating in ordinary times, far above its local election vote in 2019, and well above its general election vote in 2020. The more consistent pattern was across parties: Facebook over-represented the left opposition and under-represented the two largest parties. This fits earlier warnings about inferring votes from online attention ([Jungherr et al. 2012](#); [Gayo-Avello 2013](#); [Cameron et al. 2016](#)) and what I found for Corbyn and Farage in Britain ([Hotham 2026b](#)).

The *change* in Sinn Féin's share was more interesting, but less decisive than it first appears. A three-month rise of 12 points was without precedent in the series, it survived the checks for list selection, and it came one to three months before most pollsters recorded the party's rise, depending on which measure and which pollster one uses. But the October jump was concentrated in one page and a few posts tied to the budget and Brexit, it partly fell back in November, and the broad-based rise began in December, when one pollster already had Sinn Féin at 20%. Earlier jumps of similar size had been false signals, and in 2017–19 changes in Facebook share did not predict the polls.

There are several interpretations. One is that engagement is a sensitive measure of the energy of a party's potential supporters, which responds to intensity as well as numbers and to people who may not yet tell a pollster how they will vote. Another is that the rise reflects successful content: Doherty's campaigns on insurance and the budget, and the party's investment in video, drew attention that later fed into support. A third is that the timing was partly coincidental, with the autumn news cycle favouring the party's issues. The data cannot separate these.

5.2 What this does not show

This is one election, and the false-positive record of the same series is a reminder of how much a single success can mislead. The list was assembled in 2020; the checks reduce but cannot remove the concern that it favours that year's winners. The party coding is mine, with AI assistance, and needs independent checking. Interactions are counted at export, months after the posts, and measure attention and activity rather than support; some engagement on any party's posts comes from opponents. CrowdTangle does not record whether posts were boosted with paid advertising, which the Meta Ad Library could be used to check. The by-elections of 29 November 2019, in which Sinn Féin won a seat in Dublin Mid-West, fell inside the window, though posts about them drew little engagement. Finally, the comparison with polls is informal: with monthly data, house effects and gaps in the polling, I cannot estimate a lead with any precision. CrowdTangle closed in 2024, so replication would have to use Meta's Content Library.

5.3 Implications

For researchers, the case suggests treating platform engagement as a measure with a party-specific bias and a high false-positive rate. Its level is distorted by who uses the platform, but a large and sustained change against a party's own baseline may carry information, and the right test is how often such changes occur without a later shift in support. For journalists and parties the lesson is similar: that Sinn Féin drew more Facebook engagement than its rivals was old news by 2019; that it suddenly drew much more, for three months running, was worth noticing, though not yet worth betting on.

6 Conclusion

Facebook did not predict Sinn Féin's 2020 result in any simple sense. Its politicians drew a large share of Irish political engagement for years, including when the party did badly. Their share rose sharply in the autumn of 2019, by more than in any earlier period, and the rise came before most pollsters recorded the party's surge. But the start of that rise was concentrated in one page and a few news-driven posts, similar jumps had come to nothing before, and the series had not tracked the polls in earlier years. Whether a sustained change of this kind is a useful early signal is a question that only more elections can answer.

Provenance and AI use

The data were exported from CrowdTangle in October 2020 for my doctoral research. This paper builds on my doctoral thesis (Hotham 2021). The analysis and writing were completed in 2026.

The analysis code and drafts of the text were prepared with the assistance of an AI system (Claude, by Anthropic), which was also used to review drafts. I checked the analysis and the text and take responsibility for both.

Ethics and data

The data were collected through CrowdTangle during my doctoral research. They are public posts by public figures and candidates. In line with CrowdTangle's terms, I do not publish post-level data, and I describe the themes of highly engaging posts in general terms without reproducing them. Deposited with this paper are monthly interactions and shares by party, the list of pages with their party coding, and the list of polls used. The party coding was done with AI assistance and is provided so that it can be checked.

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A Appendix

Table 3. Pages, posts and interactions by party, November 2016 to October 2020.

Party	Pages	Posts	Interactions (millions)
Sinn Féin	41	40,689	6.57
Fianna Fáil	66	80,884	2.87
Fine Gael	62	46,795	3.26
Solidarity–People Before Profit	23	35,485	3.11
Green Party	31	10,245	0.38
Labour	21	14,817	0.60
Social Democrats	14	6,776	0.21
Aontú	11	3,486	0.23
Independents	45	38,320	3.07
Other parties	14	5,132	0.25
Not classified	29	15,161	0.44
Total	357	297,790	21.01

Table 4. Single-month rises of ten points or more in Sinn Féin's share of Facebook interactions, February 2017 to October 2019, and the change in its pollster-adjusted poll rating over the following one to three and four to six months (percentage points), relative to the previous three months.

Month	Facebook share	Monthly change	Polls, +1 to 3 months	Polls, +4 to 6 months
March 2017	44.2	+13.4	-0.1	+0.6
June 2017	29.3	+10.9	-0.5	-2.2
February 2018	33.3	+10.7	+2.6	+4.9
October 2019	29.9	+11.6	+3.2	+8.6

Table 5. Published polls, June 2019 to February 2020 (fieldwork end date). Compiled from [Wikipedia contributors \(2026b\)](#); the 2017–19 polls used for the comparisons in the text come from the same source.

Date	Pollster (commissioner)	Sinn Féin	Fianna Fáil	Fine Gael
2019-06-11	Behaviour & Attitudes (Sunday Times)	12	28	23
2019-07-16	Behaviour & Attitudes (Sunday Times)	14	30	26
2019-09-12	Red C (Business Post)	12	28	29
2019-09-17	Behaviour & Attitudes (Sunday Times)	20	29	26
2019-10-13	Ipsos MRBI (Irish Times)	14	25	29
2019-10-15	Behaviour & Attitudes (Sunday Times)	16	28	29
2019-10-24	Red C (Business Post)	11	24	32
2019-11-12	Behaviour & Attitudes (Sunday Times)	17	25	27
2019-11-21	Red C (Business Post)	11	24	30
2019-12-17	Behaviour & Attitudes (Sunday Times)	20	27	27
2019-12-24	Ireland Thinks (Irish Daily Mail / Mail on Sunday)	15	25	28
2020-01-14	Behaviour & Attitudes (Sunday Times)	19	32	20
2020-01-18	Ipsos MRBI (Irish Times)	21	25	23
2020-01-23	Red C (Business Post)	19	26	23
2020-01-25	Ireland Thinks (Irish Daily Mail / Mail on Sunday)	20	27	22
2020-01-30	Panelbase (The Times (Ireland))	21	23	19
2020-01-30	Red C (Business Post)	24	24	21
2020-02-01	Ipsos MRBI (Irish Times)	25	23	20