

Different Campaigns, Similar Totals: Republican and Democratic Senate Candidates on Facebook in 2020

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Abstract

Facebook is often said to reward the American right. I test the claim on matched pairs: the Facebook pages of the Democratic and Republican nominees in 20 contested 2020 US Senate races, over the final eight weeks before 28 October 2020 (8,125 posts from CrowdTangle). Democrats posted about twice as often as their opponents (median 30 against 19 posts a week). Republican posts tended to draw more engagement each, especially shares and comments: within races, about 50% more of each, though how strong the evidence is depends on how posts and pages are weighted. Because Democrats posted more, total engagement did not differ clearly between the two sides, and per follower Democratic pages drew, if anything, more. The clearest differences were in kind. Democratic posts drew a higher share of “love” reactions in 17 of 20 races; Republican posts more “haha”. Republicans posted more about Donald Trump, the Supreme Court and socialism; Democrats about health care, voting and donations. Angry reactions rose on posts mentioning the other side’s presidential candidate. A candidate’s share of engagement was not associated with their vote once the state’s presidential vote was taken into account. On candidates’ own pages, the two parties ran different campaigns and drew different reactions, but similar totals.

Keywords: Facebook; US Senate; 2020 election; political communication; engagement; reactions; CrowdTangle

1 Introduction

A common claim about Facebook in American politics is that it favours the right. Studies of news on the platform found that right-leaning and less reliable sources drew more engagement per follower than others (Edelson et al. 2021), and research on Twitter found that its ranking algorithm amplified right-leaning politicians more than left-leaning ones in most countries studied (Huszár et al. 2022). Explanations range from platform design, which rewards content that provokes strong reactions (Rathje et al. 2021; Brady et al. 2021), to differences in how the left and right organise online (Freelon et al. 2020).

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Most of this evidence comes from news pages, influencers and the most popular posts. Less is known about the pages candidates use to campaign. Candidates offer a useful test because they come in matched pairs. In each Senate race a Democrat and a Republican compete for the same voters at the same time, in the same state and media market. If Facebook engagement favours Republicans, the gap should appear between opponents in the same race.

I compare the Facebook pages of the two major-party nominees in 20 Senate races in the final weeks of the 2020 campaign. I ask four questions. Did the parties' candidates use their pages differently? Did Republican posts receive more engagement than Democratic posts in the same race? Did the kind of engagement differ? And was engagement on candidates' pages related to the result? The analysis is exploratory: it was not pre-registered, and I report the robustness of each result to alternative estimators.

2 Background

Research on candidates' Facebook pages has asked what drives engagement with campaign posts. Negative and attacking posts tend to draw more engagement than positive ones (Auter and Fine 2016; Xenos et al. 2017), as do posts with emotional content and posts that feature the candidate personally (Heiss et al. 2019; Bene 2017; Stier et al. 2018). The emotional reactions Facebook introduced in 2016 make it possible to see not only how much people engage but how they respond: posts about opponents and contentious issues draw more angry reactions, and positive self-presentation more love (Eberl et al. 2020). Out-group content, posts about the other side, draws particularly strong engagement (Rathje et al. 2021).

Three arguments predict that Republican candidates would receive more engagement. The first is *content*: if Republican campaigns relied more on out-group content, for example warnings about socialism, their posts would draw more engagement. The second is *audiences*: right-leaning news sources drew more engagement per follower on Facebook (Edelson et al. 2021), and conservative audiences were more ideologically segregated in the news they saw (González-Bailón et al. 2023). The third is *organisation*: Freelon et al. (2020) argue that the right has used platforms more effectively through networks of partisan media and influencers.

There are also reasons to doubt the gap would appear on candidates' pages. Candidate pages are campaign tools, used to raise money, recruit volunteers and get out the vote (Stromer-Galley 2014; Kreiss 2016). Campaigns choose how often to post, and one that gets less engagement per post can post more. And in a nationalised era, Senate results are driven largely by state partisanship and the presidential vote (Abramowitz and Webster 2016), leaving little room for any page to matter.

I therefore expected Republican posts to draw more engagement and more angry reactions than Democratic posts in the same race, and posts about out-groups to draw more engagement for both parties. I had no firm expectation about posting volume, total engagement or the relation to the vote. In earlier work I studied the Facebook pages of party leaders and parties in Britain (Hotham 2026a) and the comment sections of the 2016 US presidential candidates (Hotham 2026b); this paper turns to the candidates' posts in a different kind of contest.

3 Data and methods

3.1 Pages and posts

The posts come from two CrowdTangle lists of 2020 Senate candidates' Facebook pages, one for each party, which I exported on 28 October 2020 (CrowdTangle Team 2020). CrowdTangle recorded every public post on each page with its interactions at the time of export (likes, comments, shares and the reactions love, care, wow, haha, sad and angry) and the number of page likes when the post was made, which I use as the measure of audience size.

The lists contained pages for 78 candidates, including primary candidates. I kept the 20 races in which both major-party nominees' pages were present: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia (regular election), Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. Of the other 15 races, 12 were missing one nominee's page (Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island and Wyoming), Arkansas had no Democratic nominee, and Georgia's special election had several candidates of each party. I also excluded Nebraska, where the state Democratic Party withdrew its support from its nominee during the campaign, so the two pages were not a like-for-like contest. The missing races include competitive ones, notably Montana and Minnesota, so the sample is not every competitive race.

Most pages were campaign pages, with usernames such as *McConnellForSenate* or *collins4senator*. Nine were the candidate's long-standing personal page, including Cory Booker's, which had over a million likes from his presidential campaign, and John Cornyn's. I classify each page from its username (Appendix Table 2) and show that the results hold when this is controlled for.

I focus on the final eight weeks, 1 September to 28 October 2020, when all nominees were known: 8,125 posts on 40 pages. CrowdTangle time stamps are in UK time, which shifts the window's edges by four to five hours relative to US Eastern time. I repeat the analysis for all of 2020 (27,609 posts). Data collection ended six days before polling day.

3.2 Measures

Engagement is the total of likes, comments, shares and reactions on a post. I also analyse shares and comments separately, because they are the forms of engagement that pass a post to new audiences, and the share of all likes and reactions that were love, haha or angry.

Content. I flag posts that mention Donald Trump, Joe Biden, Covid-19, health care, the Supreme Court, socialism or the radical left (including "defund the police"), China, voting (calls to vote and information about how to vote), donations, and a short list of attack words. The word lists are in the appendix. I read 15 randomly chosen matches for each list. All 15 were correct for eight of the lists, 14 for voting, and 12 for attack words, where some matches were not attacks on an opponent.

Results. For each race I use the two-party Senate vote and the two-party presidential vote in the state.

3.3 Analysis

I compare the two candidates in each race in two ways. At the page level, I compare each page's posting rate, median engagement per post and reaction shares with its opponent's, and report the number of races

the Republican led, the median ratio, and both a sign test and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the log ratio.

At the post level, I regress the logarithm of one plus engagement on a Republican indicator, with race fixed effects and controls for logged page likes, incumbency and post type, clustering standard errors by page. Because Democrats posted more, this weights Democratic pages more heavily. I therefore also report estimates that weight each page equally, and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates on the raw counts. With only 40 pages and 20 races, conventional clustered standard errors can be too small, so I also report standard errors clustered by race and p -values from a permutation test that swaps the party labels of the two pages within races. I report results excluding each race in turn, and excluding the last week of data, when posts had less time to accumulate engagement (14% of Democratic and 13% of Republican posts fell in that week).

To relate engagement to results, I regress the Republican two-party Senate vote on the Republican two-party presidential vote in the state and the Republican share of the two pages' total engagement.

4 Findings

4.1 Democrats posted more

Democratic candidates posted much more than Republicans (Figure 1, left). In the final eight weeks the median Democratic page posted 30 times a week and the median Republican page 19 times. The Democrat posted more in 14 of the 20 races, and across races about 1.9 times as often (Wilcoxon $p = 0.02$; sign test $p = 0.12$). The largest gaps were Mike Espy in Mississippi (66 posts a week against Cindy Hyde-Smith's 24), Amy McGrath in Kentucky (47 against 2 on Mitch McConnell's campaign page) and Doug Jones in Alabama (46 against Tommy Tuberville's 12). Of the six Republicans who posted more than their opponents, the largest margins were Bill Hagerty in Tennessee, Corky Messner in New Hampshire and Daniel Gade in Virginia.

Republican pages had more page likes in 13 races, by a median ratio of 1.5, but the difference was not statistically clear ($p = 0.19$).

4.2 Republican posts drew more shares and comments

Republican posts tended to draw more engagement each (Figure 1, right). The median Republican page's median post received 568 interactions, against 460 on the median Democratic page. The Republican's typical post drew more engagement than the Democrat's in 13 of 20 races, by a median ratio of 1.3, but this page-level difference was not statistically clear (Wilcoxon $p = 0.08$; sign test $p = 0.26$).

Post-level models give a clearer picture for shares and comments than for engagement as a whole (Table 1). With each post weighted equally, Republican posts drew about 28% more interactions than Democratic posts in the same race, too imprecise to rule out no difference. Weighting each page equally, or using Poisson models on the raw counts, the gap was about 50% and statistically clear. For shares and comments the gap was about 50% with each post weighted equally, and larger with each page weighted equally or with Poisson models. These differences survive the permutation test ($p = 0.04$ for shares, 0.05 for comments) but are less certain with standard errors clustered by race ($p = 0.08$ and 0.07). Excluding each race in turn, the estimate for interactions ranged from 0.13 to 0.41; it was smallest without Alabama, Michigan or Virginia, the three races in which a Republican challenger faced a Democratic incumbent.




Figure 1. Posts per week (left) and median interactions per post (right, log scale) for the Democratic and Republican nominees in 20 Senate races, 1 September to 28 October 2020. Races ordered by the Democrat’s posting rate.

Controlling for whether the page was a personal or campaign page, or dropping the final week, made little difference.

4.3 More posts and more per post balanced out

Because Democrats posted more and Republican posts drew somewhat more each, the totals did not differ clearly. Across the eight weeks the Republican page drew more total engagement than its opponent in 9 of 20 races, and the median ratio was 0.71 ($p = 0.28$). Relative to audience size the balance tipped towards Democrats. Engagement per post per thousand page likes was almost identical (median 20.7 on Republican pages, 16.6 on Democratic pages; $p = 1.0$), but over the whole period Democratic pages drew more total engagement per thousand page likes in 14 of 20 races, by a median ratio of about two, though this was not statistically clear ($p = 0.08$). Republican posts drew more engagement mainly because Republican pages had somewhat larger audiences and spread the engagement over fewer posts.

4.4 Love for Democrats, laughter for Republicans

The kind of engagement differed more clearly than the amount (Figure 2). On the median Democratic page, 14.6% of likes and reactions were love, against 9.5% on the median Republican page. The Democrat drew the higher share of love in 17 of 20 races ($p < 0.001$), and within races the love share

Table 1. Republican posts compared with Democratic posts in the same race, 1 September to 28 October 2020. Coefficients on the Republican indicator, with race fixed effects and controls for log page likes, incumbency and post type. 8,125 posts on 40 pages in 20 races. *p*-values: clustered by page; clustered by race; permutation of party labels within race (1,000 draws).

Outcome	Each post weighted equally (OLS)				Each page weighted equally (OLS)	Poisson (PPML)	Approx. difference
	Coef.	<i>p</i> (page)	<i>p</i> (race)	<i>p</i> (perm.)			
Log interactions	0.250	0.168	0.303	0.182	0.430 (0.008)	0.41 (0.004)	+28% to +54%
Log shares	0.386	0.020	0.084	0.043	0.484 (0.001)	0.59 (<0.001)	+47% to +81%
Log comments	0.421	0.015	0.068	0.049	0.615 (<0.001)	0.67 (<0.001)	+52% to +95%
Love share	-0.055	<0.001	<0.001	0.001	-0.046 (<0.001)	–	-5.5 pts
Haha share	0.007	0.017	0.071	0.186	0.011 (0.013)	–	+0.7 pts
Angry share	0.011	0.065	0.166	0.237	0.011 (0.055)	–	+1.1 pts




Figure 2. Love, haha and angry reactions as a share of all likes and reactions on the median Democratic and Republican page, 1 September to 28 October 2020.

on Republican posts was 5.5 percentage points lower, a difference that holds under every estimator. Republican pages drew a higher share of haha (1.8% against 1.0% on the median page; higher in 15 of 20 races, $p = 0.02$), though the post-level difference is less certain. Angry reactions did not differ clearly between the parties (4.1% against 3.0%; $p = 0.45$), so my expectation that Republican posts would draw more anger was not met.

4.5 What each side posted about

The two sides campaigned on different subjects (Figure 3). Republicans mentioned Donald Trump in 11% of posts, against 4% for Democrats; the Supreme Court in 10% against 4%, during the weeks of Amy Coney Barrett’s nomination; socialism or the radical left in 5% against under 1%; and China in 2% against almost none. Democrats mentioned health care in 11% of posts against 3%, voting in 10% against 6%, donations in 8% against 3%, and Covid-19 in 9% against 5%.

Some subjects drew more engagement than others (Appendix Table 3). After correcting for multiple comparisons, posts mentioning the Supreme Court drew about 68% more engagement than other posts on the same side, posts mentioning Trump about 46% more, and posts with attack words about 36%




Figure 3. Share of posts mentioning each topic, Democratic and Republican nominees, 1 September to 28 October 2020. Word lists in the appendix.

more, for both parties. Health care posts drew more engagement only on Democratic pages. Posts about voting drew about 16% less engagement than other posts.

Angry reactions followed the other side. A Democratic post that mentioned Trump drew a share of angry reactions 13.5 percentage points higher than other Democratic posts, and a Republican post that mentioned Biden one 9.4 points higher. Mentions of a party’s own presidential candidate drew slightly fewer angry reactions. Republican posts mentioning socialism or the radical left drew 5.0 points more anger ($p = 0.01$), and posts with attack words about 5.5 points more on both sides. I cannot tell from the data whether this anger was directed at the out-group named in the post or at the candidate, but the pattern is the same for both parties.

4.6 Engagement was not associated with the vote

The presidential vote explained 88% of the variation in the Republican Senate vote across the 20 races. Adding the Republican’s share of the race’s Facebook engagement explained no more. The estimate implies that ten percentage points more of the engagement went with between 0.6 points less and 0.6 points more of the vote, so any association, if one exists, was small. Engagement share was not associated with which candidates ran ahead of Trump ($r = 0.05$; Figure 4). Lindsey Graham’s page drew more than three-quarters of the engagement in South Carolina, and he ran slightly behind Trump; Susan Collins drew about half in Maine and ran well ahead of him. With 20 races this is a test with limited power, not proof of no relationship.

4.7 The whole of 2020

Over the whole of 2020 the patterns are similar but weaker (Appendix Table 4). Democrats still posted more (in 14 of 20 races; $p = 0.09$), Republican posts still drew more comments ($p = 0.01$), the




Figure 4. Republican share of the two nominees’ combined Facebook engagement (1 September to 28 October 2020) against the Republican Senate nominee’s two-party vote minus Trump’s two-party vote in the state. 20 races.

differences in love and haha were if anything clearer, and the difference in shares was smaller ($p = 0.07$). The small and statistically unclear Republican edge in angry reactions in the final weeks reversed over the year.

5 Discussion

5.1 An advantage per post, not overall

The results give some support to the claim that Republican content drew more engagement on Facebook in 2020, but in a narrow form. Republican posts tended to draw more shares and comments, the forms of engagement that carry a post to new audiences. But Republicans did not draw more engagement overall, because Democratic candidates posted about twice as often, and relative to their audiences Democratic pages drew at least as much. Much of the per-post gap reflects Republican pages having somewhat larger audiences and posting less, although the gap in shares and comments remains when page likes are controlled for.

This matters for how claims about engagement and partisanship are tested. Lists of the most-engaged posts compare posts, not campaigns. A campaign that posts less often to a larger audience will feature more often among the most-engaged posts even if its total engagement is no greater. The data also cannot attribute differences to Facebook’s ranking: engagement depends on who follows a page as well as what the platform shows them.

5.2 Different campaigns

The two parties’ candidates used their pages for different jobs. Democratic nominees, most of them challengers, used their pages more to ask for votes and money and to talk about health care and the

pandemic. Republican nominees, most of them incumbents, used theirs more to tie themselves to Trump, to promote the Supreme Court nomination and to warn about socialism. The reactions reflect the division. Democratic followers responded with more love; Republican followers with more laughter. In both parties, anger rose when a post named the other side's presidential candidate, consistent with research showing that out-group content drives engagement ([Rathje et al. 2021](#)).

5.3 Engagement and votes

Engagement on candidates' pages was not associated with results once the presidential vote was taken into account. Senate elections in 2020 were highly nationalised, and the presidential vote left little to explain ([Abramowitz and Webster 2016](#)). Engagement measures attention from people who already follow a candidate, many of whom are committed supporters or opponents and some of whom live outside the state. It is not a measure of persuasion.

6 Limitations

The data come from one election and from 20 races, excluding several competitive ones, and from candidates' own pages only. They exclude advertising, which campaigns used heavily in 2020, and the wider network of pages, groups and influencers through which political content spread. Some candidates had more than one page; the lists contained one, usually the campaign page. The comparison within races holds the state constant but not everything about the candidates. Incumbency and party are closely linked in the sample (13 Republican and 5 Democratic incumbents), and the estimates vary with which races are included. The word lists capture mentions, not tone. Interactions were recorded when the data were exported, so recent posts had less time to accumulate engagement; the share of late posts was similar for both parties, and excluding the final week does not change the results.

7 Conclusion

On the Facebook pages of 2020 Senate nominees, Republican posts tended to draw more shares and comments each. Democratic nominees posted about twice as often, and total engagement did not differ clearly. The parties campaigned on different subjects and drew different reactions, more love for Democrats and more laughter for Republicans, with anger in both parties aimed at posts about the other side. None of it was associated with the result. On this evidence, the two parties' Senate candidates ran different campaigns on Facebook but drew similar totals.

Provenance and AI use

The data were exported from CrowdTangle in October 2020 for my doctoral research. This paper builds on my doctoral thesis ([Hotham 2021](#)). The analysis and writing were completed in 2026.

The analysis code and drafts of the text were prepared with the assistance of an AI system (Claude, by Anthropic), which was also used to review drafts. I checked the analysis and the text and take responsibility for both.

Data availability

Page-level aggregates for each candidate and the race-level table are deposited with this preprint. Post texts are not shared, in line with the terms under which the data were collected.

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A Appendix

Word lists

Matching is case-insensitive on the post message and any text in the post's image.

- Trump: trump. Biden: biden.
- Covid-19: covid, coronavirus, pandemic.
- Health care: health care, healthcare, obamacare, affordable care act, pre-existing.
- Supreme Court: supreme court, scotus, barrett, ginsburg, rbg.
- Socialism or radical left: socialis*, radical left, far left, radical liberal, defund, marxism*.
- China: china, chinese communist.
- Voting: go vote, vote early, early vot*, vote by mail, make a plan to vote, plan your vote, register to vote, absentee, polls open/close, drop off your ballot, cast your ballot, voting location, vote for/today/now.
- Donations: donat*, chip in, contribut*, fundrais*.
- Attack words: lie, lies, lied, lying, corrupt*, dark money, special interest(s), failed, dangerous, extreme, extremis*.

Table 2. The 20 races. Page as listed by CrowdTangle ([†] personal rather than campaign page, judged from its username); posts per week and median interactions per post, 1 September to 28 October 2020; Republican share of the two pages' total interactions (%); Republican two-party Senate and presidential vote (%).

State	Democrat	Page Republican	Posts/week		Median inter.		Rep. share of inter.	Rep. Senate vote	Trump vote
			D	R	D	R			
Alabama	Doug Jones for Senate	Tommy Tuberville	46	12	409	1,391	40	60.2	62.9
Arizona	Captain Mark Kelly [†]	Martha McSally [†]	31	35	752	961	51	48.8	49.8
Colorado	John W. Hickenlooper [†]	Cory Gardner	34	6	572	661	15	45.2	43.1
Georgia	Jon Ossoff [†]	David Perdue	35	20	592	406	24	50.9	49.9
Iowa	Theresa Greenfield	Joni Ernst	30	23	449	1,144	60	53.4	54.2
Kansas	Barbara Bollier	Dr. Roger Marshall [†]	38	31	471	278	30	56.0	57.5
Kentucky	Amy McGrath	Mitch McConnell	47	2	1,838	3,613	5	60.2	63.2
Maine	Sara Gideon	Susan Collins	22	24	360	466	55	54.6	45.3
Michigan	Gary Peters	John James	33	10	416	4,855	73	49.1	48.6
Mississippi	Mike Espy	Cindy Hyde-Smith	66	24	158	151	22	55.1	58.4
New Hampshire	Jeanne Shaheen	Corky Messner for Senate	16	34	198	110	57	42.0	46.3
New Jersey	Cory Booker [†]	Rik Mehta	18	17	5,556	374	5	41.7	41.9
North Carolina	Cal Cunningham	Thom Tillis [†]	24	28	485	475	56	50.9	50.7
Oklahoma	Abby Broyles	Jim Inhofe	10	4	566	1,095	38	65.7	66.9
South Carolina	Jaime Harrison	Lindsey Graham	18	13	1,183	6,223	78	55.2	55.9
South Dakota	Dan Ahlers for U.S. Senate	Mike Rounds [†]	14	2	71	134	28	65.7	63.4
Tennessee	Marquita Bradshaw	Bill Hagerty	29	67	198	260	78	63.9	61.8
Texas	MJ Hegar	John Cornyn [†]	29	16	715	1,106	43	54.9	52.8
Virginia	Mark Warner VA	Daniel Gade	10	23	180	1,414	94	43.9	44.8
West Virginia	Paula Jean Swearengin	Shelley Moore Capito	34	4	178	138	6	72.3	69.8

Table 3. Topics: share of posts mentioning each (%) and association with log interactions, within races, controlling for party, log page likes, incumbency and post type. Holm correction across the ten topics. Separate estimates for each party in the last two columns.

Topic	D posts	R posts	Coef.	<i>p</i>	<i>p</i> (Holm)	Democrats	Republicans
Trump	3.6	11.0	0.38	<0.001	<0.001	0.52 (<0.001)	0.41 (<0.001)
Biden	1.3	3.9	0.32	0.013	0.064	0.65 (<0.001)	0.27 (0.047)
Covid-19	9.2	5.1	0.03	0.688	1.000	0.11 (0.302)	-0.15 (0.157)
Health care	10.8	2.8	0.16	0.008	0.047	0.14 (0.012)	-0.02 (0.807)
Supreme Court	3.6	10.3	0.52	<0.001	<0.001	0.52 (<0.001)	0.47 (<0.001)
Socialism, radical left	0.2	5.3	0.12	0.243	0.971	0.32 (0.107)	0.13 (0.211)
China	0.1	2.4	-0.13	0.427	1.000	-0.16 (0.362)	-0.07 (0.500)
Voting	9.8	6.0	-0.17	0.002	0.014	-0.13 (0.065)	-0.17 (0.019)
Donations	7.9	2.7	-0.11	0.414	1.000	-0.16 (0.304)	-0.14 (0.103)
Attack words	4.4	4.9	0.31	<0.001	<0.001	0.37 (<0.001)	0.24 (0.004)

Table 4. Final eight weeks compared with all of 2020. Upper panel: races in which the Republican was higher, median Republican/Democratic ratio, Wilcoxon and sign-test p . Lower panel: post-level coefficients on the Republican indicator (as in Table 1, clustered by page).

	1 Sep to 28 Oct 2020				1 Jan to 28 Oct 2020			
	R higher	Ratio	p (W)	p (sign)	R higher	Ratio	p (W)	p (sign)
Posts per week	6/20	0.65	0.017	0.115	6/20	0.66	0.090	0.115
Page likes	13/20	1.52	0.189	0.263	13/20	1.71	0.143	0.263
Median interactions per post	13/20	1.30	0.076	0.263	12/20	1.22	0.154	0.503
Total interactions	9/20	0.71	0.277	0.824	11/20	1.10	0.674	0.824
Total interactions per 1,000 page likes	6/20	0.47	0.076	0.115	6/20	0.49	0.177	0.115
Love share	3/20	0.68	<0.001	0.003	2/20	0.72	<0.001	<0.001
Haha share	15/20	2.25	0.015	0.041	15/20	2.80	0.007	0.041
Angry share	11/20	1.59	0.452	0.824	11/20	1.07	0.701	0.824
Log interactions (post-level)		0.250	0.168			0.208	0.205	
Log shares (post-level)		0.386	0.020			0.277	0.067	
Log comments (post-level)		0.421	0.015			0.452	0.014	
Love share (post-level)		-0.055	<0.001			-0.048	<0.001	
Haha share (post-level)		0.007	0.017			0.009	0.002	
Angry share (post-level)		0.011	0.065			-0.002	0.563	